By Bethany McLean
This remarkable narrative is going again greater than two decades to bare, in wealthy, anecdotal aspect, how Wall road, the personal loan undefined, and the govt conspired to alter the way in which american citizens obtained their houses, making a ideal hurricane. The authors take us within elusive associations reminiscent of Goldman Sachs, AIG, and Fannie Mae, to bare who replaced the sport and why.
summary: This miraculous narrative is going again greater than two decades to bare, in wealthy, anecdotal element, how Wall highway, the loan undefined, and the govt. conspired to alter the best way american citizens got their houses, making a excellent hurricane. The authors take us inside of elusive associations akin to Goldman Sachs, AIG, and Fannie Mae, to bare who replaced the sport and why
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Extra info for All the devils are here : the hidden history of the financial crisis
37/1148 A few months earlier, two Bear Stearns hedge funds—funds that contained the exact same kind of subprime securities as the ones on Merrill’s books—had collapsed. Inside Merrill, there was a growing nervousness, but the leaders of the mortgage desk kept insisting that its losses would be contained—they were going to be less than $100 million, they said. The top brass, including O’Neal, accepted their judgment. Breit knew better. The losses were going to be huge—there was no getting around it.
Fannie’s ostentatious headquarters didn’t help. Under Hunter, the company had moved from modest digs on Fifteenth Street to a building in Georgetown that resembled a giant mansion. The front section had been 61/1148 occupied by an insurance company; to build the back to match perfectly, Fannie had a brickyard reopened specifically to supply the proper brick. “To many people, it was a living symbol of power and arrogance,” says Maxwell. Yet for all their resentment, people were envious of Fannie Mae’s employees.
The baby boom generation was growing up. Boomers were going to want their own homes, just like their parents. But given their vast numbers—there were 76 million births between 1949 and 1964—many economists worried that there wouldn’t be enough capital to fund all their mortgages. This worry was exacerbated by the fact that the main provider of mortgages, the savings and loan, or thrift, industry, was in terrible straits. The thrifts financed their loans by offering depositors savings accounts, which paid an interest rate set by law at 5¾ percent.