

# Beyond the Cold War

Lyndon Johnson and the  
New Global Challenges of the 1960s



*Edited by Francis J. Gavin and Mark Atwood Lawrence*

## BEYOND THE COLD WAR



## REINTERPRETING HISTORY

Wm. Roger Louis, *series editor*

Historiography is the art of conveying the ways in which the interpretation of history changes over time. The series Reinterpreting History is dedicated to the historian's craft of challenging assumptions, examining new evidence, and placing topics of significance in historiographical context. The vigorous and systematic revision of history is at the heart of the discipline.

Reinterpreting History is an initiative of the National History Center, which was created by the American Historical Association in 2002 to advance historical knowledge and to convey to the public at large the context of present-day issues. The books in the series usually have their origins in sessions organized by the National History Center at the annual meetings of the AHA.

*Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives* ■ EDITED BY Mark Philip Bradley and Marilyn B. Young

*Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal* ■ EDITED BY Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan

*The Human Rights Revolution: An International History* ■ EDITED BY Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock

*The Cold War in the Third World* ■ EDITED BY Robert J. McMahon

*Reinterpreting Exploration: The West in the World* ■ EDITED BY Dane Kennedy

*Beyond the Cold War: Lyndon Johnson and the New Global Challenges of the 1960s* ■ EDITED BY Francis J. Gavin and Mark Atwood Lawrence

BEYOND THE COLD WAR

*Lyndon Johnson and the New Global  
Challenges of the 1960s*

EDITED BY

Francis J. Gavin

and Mark Atwood Lawrence

OXFORD  
UNIVERSITY PRESS

# OXFORD

UNIVERSITY PRESS

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.  
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,  
and education by publishing worldwide.

Oxford New York  
Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi  
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi  
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto

With offices in  
Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece  
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore  
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam

Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press  
in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by  
Oxford University Press  
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

© Oxford University Press 2014

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a  
retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior  
permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law,  
by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization.  
Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the  
Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form  
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data  
Beyond the Cold War : Lyndon Johnson and the new global challenges of the 1960s / edited  
by Francis J. Gavin and Mark Atwood Lawrence.  
pages cm. — (Reinterpreting history)

- ISBN 978-0-19-979069-2 (alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-19-979070-8 (alk. paper)  
1. United States—Foreign relations—1963–1969. 2. United States—Foreign economic  
relations. 3. World politics—1955–1965. 4. World politics—1965–1975. 5. World  
health—Government policy—United States. 6. Economic assistance, American.  
7. Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908–1973—Political and social views. I. Gavin,  
Francis J., editor of compilation. II. Lawrence, Mark Atwood, editor of compilation.

E846.B49 2014  
327.73009'046—dc23  
2013023263

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2  
Printed in the United States of America  
on acid-free paper

## CONTENTS

Acknowledgments vii

Contributors ix

Introduction 1

FRANCIS J. GAVIN AND MARK ATWOOD LAWRENCE

### PART I *Thinking Beyond East and West*

1. Lyndon Johnson and the Challenges of Economic  
Globalization 17

DANIEL SARGENT

2. Towards a New Deal for the World? Lyndon Johnson's  
Aspirations to Renew the Twentieth Century's *Pax  
Americana* 44

PATRICK O. COHRS

3. Moving Beyond the Cold War: The Johnson  
Administration, Bridge-Building, and *Détente* 76

THOMAS A. SCHWARTZ

### PART II *Internationalizing the Great Society*

4. One Global War on Poverty: The Johnson Administration  
Fights Poverty at Home and Abroad, 1964–1968 97

SHEYDA JAHANBANI

5. LBJ's Third War: The War on Hunger 118

NICK CULLATHER

6. LBJ and World Population: Planning the Greater Society  
One Family at a Time 141

MATTHEW CONNELLY

7. Globalizing the Great Society: Lyndon Johnson and the  
Pursuit of Smallpox Eradication 165

EREZ MANELA

PART III *Adapting to a World of Scarcity*

8. “Thinking Globally”: American Foreign Aid, Paul Ehrlich, and the Emergence of Environmentalism in the 1960s 185

TOM ROBERTSON

9. “More a Gun at Our Heads than Theirs”: The 1967 Arab Oil Embargo, Third World Raw Material Sovereignty, and American Diplomacy 207

CHRISTOPHER R. W. DIETRICH

PART IV *Shifting Moralities*

10. The Rise of Human Rights during the Johnson Years 237

SARAH B. SNYDER

11. Globalized Faith, Radicalized Religion, and the Domestic Sources of US Foreign Policy 261

ANDREW PRESTON

- Index 285

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book results from the collaboration of thirteen scholars whose names appear in the table of contents. But it would not have come to fruition without the support, advice, and enthusiasm of many other individuals to whom we owe an enormous debt of gratitude. Most of all, our thanks go to Betty Sue Flowers, who served as director of the LBJ Presidential Library when this project began. Betty Sue allowed us to live every scholar's dream—to bring together an all-star cast of characters for an intensive workshop focused on new, unusual, and slightly risky questions.

Sincere thanks go as well to Larry Temple and the Lyndon B. Johnson Foundation and to James Steinberg, the former dean of the LBJ School of Public Affairs. We are also grateful to Mark Updegrave, who provided continued enthusiasm for the project after taking over as director of the LBJ Library in 2009. All of the authors in this collection benefited tremendously from the assistance of Claudia Anderson, Jennifer Cuddeback, Allen Fisher, Regina Greenwell, John Wilson, and the rest of the Library's unrivaled archival team.

The conference that gave rise to this book succeeded because of the contributions of several scholars besides those who contributed chapters. Our thanks go to Francis Bator, Jeffrey Engel, Bobby Ray Inman, Fredrik Logevall, William Roger Louis, Jason Parker, Alan Tully, and Randall Woods. Mark Lawrence wishes to thank UT-Austin's Institute for Historical Studies and the Stanley Kaplan Program in American Foreign Policy at Williams College, both of which provided generous support while he was working on this book. Francis Gavin would like to thank the staff of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the University of Texas, particularly Celeste Ward Gventer and Jessica Mahoney.

At Oxford University Press, Susan Ferber provided invaluable advice throughout the process and shepherded the book to completion with her usual combination of keen editorial eye, enthusiasm, and patience. We also appreciated the helpful comments and suggestions from two anonymous reviewers. Lynn Childress did a first-rate job of copy-editing, and our thanks go as well to our superb production editor, Bharathy Surya Prakash.

If there is one individual whose spirit, enthusiasm, and curiosity inspired this book from its inception, it is Harry Middleton, who directed the LBJ

Presidential Library for thirty years and has never stopped asking provocative questions about the Johnson presidency. Both of us have benefited tremendously from his friendship and mentorship during our years in Austin. We dedicate this book to him as a small tribute to the role he has played in our lives and, less directly, in the lives of innumerable scholars concerned with the Johnson years.

## CONTRIBUTORS

PATRICK O. COHRS is associate professor of history and international relations at Yale University. He is the author of *The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919–1932* (2006).

MATTHEW CONNELLY is professor of history at Columbia University. He is the author of *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post–Cold War Era* (2003) and *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (2008).

NICK CULLATHER is professor of history and international studies at Indiana University. He is the author, most recently, of *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia* (2010).

CHRISTOPHER R. W. DIETRICH is assistant professor of history at Fordham University. He is the author of articles in *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, *The International History Review*, *Itinerario*, and *CounterPunch*. His forthcoming book examines the diplomatic and ideological origins of the 1970s energy crisis.

FRANCIS J. GAVIN is the Tom Slick Professor of International Affairs at the LBJ School of Public Affairs and the Director of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the University of Texas. He is the author of *Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–1971* (2004) and *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age* (2012).

SHEYDA JAHANBANI is assistant professor of history at the University of Kansas. She is the author of *"The Poverty of the World": Rediscovering the Poor at Home and Abroad* (forthcoming 2014) as well as articles on the history of postwar liberalism and the Cold War.

MARKATWOODLAWRENCE is associate professor of history at the University of Texas at Austin. He is author of *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to Vietnam* (2005) and *The Vietnam War: A Concise*

*International History* (2008) as well as numerous articles and chapters on the history of the Cold War.

EREZ MANELA is professor of history at Harvard University. He is author of *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (2007) and co-editor of *Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (2010). His next book will focus on the global campaign to eradicate smallpox in the 1960s and 1970s.

ANDREW PRESTON is senior lecturer in American history and a fellow of Clare College at Cambridge University, where he also serves as editor of *The Historical Journal*. He is the author of *The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam* (2006) and co-editor, with Fredrik Logevall, of *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969–1977* (2008). His most recent book is *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy* (2012).

TOM ROBERTSON is associate professor of history at Worcester Polytechnic Institute. He is author of *The Malthusian Moment: Global Population Growth and the Birth of American Environmentalism* (2012). His new research uses archival and ethnographic data to illuminate the environmental history of US development projects in Nepal during the Cold War.

DANIEL SARGENT is assistant professor of history at the University of California, Berkeley. He is coeditor of *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (2010) and is completing a book on US foreign policy in the 1970s.

THOMAS A. SCHWARTZ is a professor of history at Vanderbilt University. He is the author of *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (1991) and *Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam* (2003). He is also editor, with Matthias Schulz, of *The Strained Alliance: US–European Relations in the 1970s* (2009).

SARAH B. SNYDER is a lecturer in international history at University College London. She is the author of *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (2011) as well as chapters and articles on the Cold War, human rights activism, and US human rights policy.

## BEYOND THE COLD WAR



## INTRODUCTION

FRANCIS J. GAVIN AND MARK ATWOOD LAWRENCE

Lyndon B. Johnson's commencement address at the College of the Holy Cross on June 10, 1964, began like innumerable speeches by American presidents during the Cold War. Johnson touched on his determination to avoid "the annihilation of nuclear war" and pledged "to find a way to peace in a world where freedom grows." But then Johnson veered away from such platitudes and said something more unusual in the annals of Cold War rhetoric. "Even if we end terror and even if we eliminate tension, even if we reduce arms and restrict conflict, even if peace were to come to the nations," Johnson declared, "we would turn from this struggle only to find ourselves on a new battleground as filled with danger and as fraught with difficulty as any ever faced by man. For many of our most urgent problems," the president continued, "do not spring from the cold war or even from the ambitions of our adversaries." Johnson went on to describe three global problems that "stretch beyond present differences" and would inevitably "persist beyond the cold war": poverty, epidemic disease, and diminishing natural resources. He urged the graduating class to take such challenges seriously and warned against any temptation to see them as irrelevant to American interests. "Those who live in the emerging community of nations," LBJ said, "will ignore the problems of their neighbors at the risk of their own prosperity."<sup>1</sup>

Johnson hit on similar themes in subsequent speeches but also pointed to other long-range problems that threatened the future of humanity. In his 1965 State of the Union address, the president promised to "seek new ways to use our knowledge to help deal with the explosion in world population and the growing scarcity of world resources."<sup>2</sup> Two years later, LBJ returned to the theme with more alarming words. "Next to the pursuit of peace, the really greatest challenge facing the human family is the race between food supply and population increase," he asserted in January 1967, adding ominously, "That race tonight is being lost."<sup>3</sup> Johnson even spoke about what a later generation would call global warming. "This generation," he insisted to Congress in February 1965, "has altered the composition of the atmosphere on a global scale through . . . a steady increase in carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels."<sup>4</sup>

## 2 *Introduction*

Johnson did not speak in these ways very often. Nor did such concerns preoccupy the National Security Council, the State Department, or the Pentagon during Johnson's presidency from 1963 to 1969, when US diplomacy, along with the attention of American media and public opinion, was focused overwhelmingly on the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and increasingly Vietnam—on, in short, the Cold War. Johnson's words were not, however, an aberration or mere historical curiosity. Throughout LBJ's years in office, the president and his aides showed steady, if rarely headline-making, interest in global challenges that transcended the East–West rivalry. As at Holy Cross, the president paid lip service to such problems from time to time. More importantly, he acted on some of them—above all, global poverty, population growth, and disease—with decisiveness that has rarely received attention from scholars of American foreign relations. Among twentieth-century presidents, LBJ's attention to emerging global challenges ranks him among the most cognizant of the need to think beyond immediate geopolitical challenges to consider problems on the distant horizon, even if ultimately his effort was a mixed bag of bold activism and striking passivity, great successes and miserable failures.

This book brings together some of the most innovative scholars of international affairs in the 1960s to explore how American leaders—above all, Johnson and his aides—thought about problems that political scientists would later dub “new security challenges”<sup>5</sup> and to weigh the policy responses that they devised. This objective is unapologetically “presentist” in the sense that the book is inspired by the pressing concerns of the twenty-first century and traces those concerns back into the past. Isolating US attempts to cope with, for example, epidemic diseases or human rights violations risks giving such issues greater prominence than they held at the time and exaggerating the extent to which policymakers conceived of an agenda wholly separate from the Cold War. This potential for distortion is, however, a small price to pay in order to gain leverage on present-day problems by studying how policymakers sought to deal with them in the past. Indeed, this book rests on the conviction that historians have a significant role to play in devising solutions to urgent global challenges by describing little-studied precedents for current dilemmas, exposing reasons for past successes and failures, and teasing out lessons for the future.

One major goal of the book, in fact, is to demonstrate that the 1960s were a crucially important period in the development of global conditions and challenges that dominate the international agenda in the early twenty-first century. For most historians of international affairs, of course, the decade was dominated by the East–West struggle—and with good reason. The

Sixties began with dangerous crises over Berlin and Cuba and closed with conflict in the Middle East, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the seemingly endless struggle in Vietnam. In between, anxiety about Europe's political orientation, worry about the nuclear arms race, and fear of Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban dynamism in the developing world, among other Cold War concerns, reverberated in Washington, D.C. The period of relative *détente* ushered in by the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 did little to change the basic framework within which American (not to mention Soviet, Chinese, and other) officials viewed international affairs. Yet, with the indispensable benefit of hindsight, the 1960s appears as a period in which a new set of global problems, largely independent of the Cold War, began to take a form still recognizable several decades later.

To be sure, earlier US presidents and policymakers had occasionally concerned themselves with international problems that transcended geopolitical preoccupations of the moment. Especially in the Progressive Era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American leaders took a broad view of security and endeavored to bring new technologies and expertise to bear on environmental, demographic, and public health problems both within the United States and around the globe. Recent scholarship has suggested, too, that President Franklin D. Roosevelt and other US leaders were motivated in part by a broad vision of human security and progress as they worked during World War II to craft institutions to regulate a new global order.<sup>6</sup> But global issues gained new prominence in the 1960s for at least three intertwined reasons. First, dramatic social change in many parts of the world, along with a pervasive sense of frustration about stalemated East–West tensions, sparked mounting dissent against the Cold War geopolitical order. For growing numbers of Americans and citizens of other countries, especially young people, the rigidities of the US–Soviet confrontation increasingly seemed to be a barrier to human progress in policy arenas most directly connected to human welfare and happiness over the long run.<sup>7</sup> Only by overcoming or at least looking beyond the Cold War could the world, in the opinion of a growing body of concerned citizens, properly address global disparities of wealth, epidemic diseases such as smallpox and polio, human rights abuses, environmental crises flowing from rampant industrialization and consumerism, depletion of natural resources, and other problems.

Second, the 1960s gave rise to increasingly large and ambitious international organizations and networks of activists, many of which were dedicated to addressing problems such as poverty, hunger, population growth, disease, human rights, and environmental pollution. The number of inter-governmental organizations worldwide rose from 154 in 1960 to 280 at

the end of the decade, while the number of nongovernmental international organizations soared from 1,268 to 2,795 over the same period, according to the Union of International Associations. Especially striking, argues historian Akira Iriye, was the growth during the decade of organizations concerned with—and often constructing branches in—the emerging nations of the developing world, whose problems seemed largely irrelevant to the Cold War.<sup>8</sup> Increasingly popular, well-organized, and well-funded, such organizations applied political pressure that was difficult for national governments, not least the Johnson administration, to ignore.

Third, rapidly changing technology dramatically accelerated the world's economic, political, and cultural interconnectedness during the 1960s. The wider availability of jet travel, the increasing speed and efficiency of telecommunications, and the expansion of television in the 1950s and 1960s, to cite just a few of the most obvious transformations, enabled people to grasp developments in faraway places and to appreciate in a more visceral way than ever before the human costs of disease, hunger, poverty, and human rights abuses. Thus, not only informed and highly motivated activists but also ordinary citizens increasingly formed opinions about issues that had not generally captured headlines or preoccupied statesmen in earlier times. The Johnson administration, like other governments around the world, increasingly felt pressure to address such problems while also seeing opportunities to win votes, especially among the young, by demonstrating a global mentality that looked beyond current geopolitical preoccupations.

\* \* \*

If the 1960s are a key period for examining the rise of a new agenda of global concerns, the decade also constitutes an ideal timeframe for evaluating how policymakers performed in responding to it. A second major goal of this collection is to explore how US officials, especially LBJ and his aides, understood the emerging challenges and made policy to address them. Unquestionably, it would be illuminating to examine the attitudes of governments (or supranational or nongovernmental organizations) around the world to problems that were, after all, global in scope. But focusing on the United States permits in-depth analysis of the nation that undoubtedly wielded greatest power and possessed the greatest capacity to shape the global response to new kinds of problems. Concentrating on a single administration also allows for the exploration of how a single set of policymakers thought about a wide range of issues, thus giving the book analytical depth and coherence. Finally, looking closely at the Johnson administration provides a fresh angle of vision on one of America's most complex, controversial, and fascinating presidencies.

LBJ has not enjoyed a favorable reputation among historians and other commentators. One reason for the generally dim view of him is the understandable focus on US military escalation in Vietnam, which the vast majority of scholars regard as a monumental error. Additionally, Johnson suffers by comparison with the foreign policy records of his immediate predecessor and successor as president. Though sharply different from each other in many respects, John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon not only were, in the estimation of many scholars, innovative and largely successful in international affairs but also initiated policy departures that proved enormously consequential in a broad range of fields including arms control, international economics, and superpower relations. By contrast, the Johnson administration has been portrayed as, at best, too distracted by Southeast Asia to do more than tread water in other policy areas and, at worst, out of its depth on the most important international issues of the day.

Much of this criticism is deserved. Unlike American military interventions in Korea or, more recently, the Balkans, the passage of time has only sharpened criticism of Johnson's policies in Vietnam. Some have gone so far as to argue that, had he not been assassinated, Kennedy would have withdrawn US forces from Vietnam or, at the very least, stopped short of the massive conventional war that Johnson chose to wage.<sup>9</sup> But one does not need to embrace such speculation in order to take a harsh view of Johnson. New scholarship has largely demolished the old view, advanced especially by journalist David Halberstam, that LBJ's advisers bullied him into escalation. Secretly recorded telephone conversations suggest not that Johnson was intimidated by persuasive and worldly aides such as National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara but that he genuinely believed there was no reasonable alternative to a major war.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, recent scholarship has undermined the contention that domestic political pressure or the need to maintain America's alliances warranted escalation in Vietnam. A few studies of US policymaking toward other Cold War flash points of the developing world during the Johnson presidency—notably the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Indonesia, and southern Africa—paint a similarly unflattering portrait of a president largely incapable of sophisticated thinking.<sup>11</sup>

Meanwhile, many historians continue to write in admiring terms about the foreign policies of Kennedy and Nixon. While scholars have long since debunked the hagiography of Camelot, Kennedy was at the helm during arguably the most dangerous geopolitical crisis the world has ever faced—the Cuban Missile Crisis—and managed to protect American interests while avoiding war. Scholars such as Marc Trachtenberg, meanwhile, have

highlighted the Kennedy administration's skillful handling of the complex and explosive issues surrounding the status of Germany and proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>12</sup> More generally, many have viewed Kennedy as a sensible pragmatist in foreign affairs, a skeptic about the Cold War (despite his frequently sweeping anti-communist rhetoric), and a relatively nuanced leader capable of long-term thinking. Richard Nixon indisputably pursued bold and coherent international strategies. Whether one approves of Nixon's initiatives, the opening of US–Chinese relations, the ending of the Bretton Woods monetary arrangements, and the SALT and ABM treaties signed with the Soviet Union were dramatic achievements of a president confident in his vision of global politics and possessing the ability to see beyond immediate challenges to appreciate the nation's place in an evolving world order.

It has been hard, at least until recently, to make such a claim for the Johnson administration. Only a few scholars have entertained the possibility that LBJ's preoccupation with Vietnam had obscured his long-term vision, skillful policymaking, or even significant accomplishments on other issues. By far the most thorough scholarly work along these lines is Thomas Alan Schwartz's *Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam*. Schwartz argues that LBJ deftly handled the complexities of relations within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization when France, Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany began chafing at American power as the threat of Soviet attack on Western Europe seemed to recede. Indeed, contends Schwartz, the president prevented the alliance from collapsing by managing France's defection from NATO's political structure—no small accomplishment. Moreover, Schwartz credits LBJ with advancing the cause of nuclear arms control despite resistance from the US military, key allies, and even members of his own administration.<sup>13</sup> Johnson not only laid the groundwork for negotiations to limit US and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons but also, and more consequentially, crafted the groundbreaking 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which sought to limit the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the existing nuclear powers. Though a product of the Cold War, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a cornerstone of international peace and stability in the twenty-first century, having kept the number of nuclear powers in the single digits—a fact that would have deeply gratified Johnson.

Other reappraisals of US diplomacy in the Johnson era come in passing in books devoted to much broader sweeps of time or in works focused on relatively narrow policy areas. Such works do not make fully developed arguments for thinking anew about global affairs in the LBJ presidency, though they provide intriguing suggestions that a broad reappraisal may be in order.

Much of the work in this vein contends that Johnson's basic vision of US foreign policy flowed from a desire to extend the Great Society into a global program to fight poverty and generate opportunity. Understandably, the bulk of scholarship on the Great Society concentrates on purely domestic aspects of LBJ's signature initiative. The president, after all, rarely claimed in any specific way that his programs were intended to reach beyond American shores. Yet a few scholars see continuity between the ethos underpinning the Great Society and a broader sympathy for poor and marginalized populations abroad. Historian Randall B. Woods takes the argument furthest, maintaining in his biography that, for Johnson, "compassion was not divisible." Woods goes so far as to contend that Johnson's commitment to South Vietnam emerged fundamentally from the same "Christian idealism" that drove his commitment to wage war against poverty at home.<sup>14</sup>

Other authors convinced of basic continuity between domestic and foreign policy go beyond Cold War flashpoints such as Vietnam to explore aspects of Johnson-era foreign policy that have received far less attention and point to a broad vision independent of the East–West conflict. In *Transplanting the Great Society*, historian Kristin L. Ahlberg contends that Johnson's concern with social "uplift" at home infused his ambitious policies to extend food aid to developing nations and help those nations achieve greater agricultural self-sufficiency.<sup>15</sup> Nick Cullather and Michael E. Latham similarly suggest in recent books that Johnson aimed to fight poverty and hunger through the same blend of expertise, technology, and administrative ingenuity characteristic of Great Society programs at home.<sup>16</sup> In his 2008 *Fatal Misconception*, meanwhile, Matthew Connelly zeroes in on one element of Johnson's poverty-fighting efforts that he pursued much more assertively overseas than at home: reducing population growth.<sup>17</sup>

Taken together, all of these works suggest that US foreign policy was formulated to do something larger than simply containing communism, even if containment unquestionably remained the top US priority throughout the Johnson years. Whether this broader global agenda encompassed more than efforts to combat nuclear proliferation and fight poverty and hunger is an open question. Scholars have done little to examine US policymaking with respect to global environmental challenges, resources depletion, epidemic disease, human rights, religion, or other matters examined in this collection. The present volume, then, attempts to suggest links among topics that have been treated mostly in isolation, while also delving for the first time into issues that have escaped close examination but might, if examined together, suggest the full breadth of attempts by American leaders to respond to profound and rapid change around the globe.