By Gregory A. Huber
How do curiosity teams and elected officers impact how executive regulators implement the legislations? This publication reconciles the obvious contradiction among political understandings of forms, during which curiosity teams and elected officers form how the legislation is enforced, with bills in public management and somewhere else concerning the impartial and constant implementation of the legislations. It exhibits that bureaucracies can pursue a method of 'strategic neutrality' to construct political aid, hence demonstrating that neutrality can persist within the face of exterior pressures and has political origins.
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Additional resources for The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality
In practice, contemporary political economy builds on both traditions. This perspective is therefore similar to “systems” theories that identify equilibrating effects among competing groups and forces in society. For instance, cross-subsidization occurs when the rents derived from regulation are not retained exclusively by the group seeking state protection but are used instead to placate potentially powerful opponents of the original group’s policy efforts. The more general phenomenon of strategic compromise is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
Overall, by reifying group identity and advocacy patterns, existing theories fail to consider the dynamic relationship between the interest group environment and bureaucratic decisions (Carpenter and Whittington 2003). A more accurate understanding of the capacity for group influence must therefore account for how bureaucrats choose to use the discretion they are given and how these choices alter the political calculations surrounding interest group strategies. 5. Multiple Impulses and Bureaucratic Behavior Finally, empirical work on external control of the bureaucracy often encompasses many of the mechanisms specified by the theories discussed here into a unified framework in which multiple impulses act on the bureaucracy (see, for example, Wood and Waterman 1994; for a comprehensive review, see Krause 1999).
The nature of outside influence on the bureaucracy is linked with problems of internal management because agency leaders’ political strategies are “constrained by internal organizational considerations” (Moe 1987: 481). Concerns about management and control of subordinates arise for several reasons. Generally, task complexity and the division of authority force bureaucratic leaders to delegate authority to their subordinates. This is particularly true in the field of regulation, where enforcement outcomes result from a stream of decisions about how to identify, evaluate, and punish those who violate the law (Diver 1980).