By Darren G. Hawkins, Visit Amazon's David A. Lake Page, search results, Learn about Author Central, David A. Lake, , Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney
Why do states delegate sure initiatives and tasks to overseas companies instead of appearing unilaterally or cooperating at once? in addition, to what quantity do states proceed to manage IOs as soon as authority has been delegated? reading a number of various associations together with the area alternate association, the United countries and the ecu fee, this e-book explores the various equipment that states hire to make sure their pursuits are being served, and identifies the issues concerned with tracking and coping with IOs. The participants recommend that it's not inherently tougher to layout powerful delegation mechanisms at foreign point than at household point and, drawing on principal-agent thought, aid clarify the diversities that exist within the volume to which states are keen to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, yet are greater understood as bureaucracies that may be managed to various levels via their political masters.
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Additional resources for Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)
States may also delegate authority to IO agents to resolve disputes between themselves. As international interactions have grown more rule-governed (Goldstein et al. 2000), there has been a corresponding increase in the use of third-party agents to resolve disputes. Such arbitrating agents can be important in securing the social benefits of cooperation – and it is this cooperation that helps to explain why states delegate to these agents in the first place. The key problem in most interstate disputes is the incomplete nature of the contract among the principals.
The contract between the principal and the agent specifies the scope of the authority delegated to the latter, the instruments by which the agent is permitted to carry out its task, and the procedures that the agent should follow in employing those instruments (McCubbins and Page 1987: 412). The precise nature of the contract will reflect many considerations, but contracts are often described as varying along a single dimension of rules versus discretion. On the one hand, the principal can write detailed rules to the agent for carrying out its responsibilities.
Such ex post measures by state principals focus attention on the mechanisms of control in any delegation relationship. Mechanisms of control Principals have five major mechanisms for controlling their agents. Broadly, principals attempt to structure the incentives of agents ex ante so that it is in the interests of those agents to carry out their principals’ desires faithfully ex post. The form of delegated authority, then, is not given or fixed, but rather is endogenous to the agency relationship and largely designed by the principal to minimize the opportunistic behavior of the agent.